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INTRODUCTION
Justice Clarence Thomas has been on the nation's highest court
for almost twenty years. When he arrived at the Supreme Court,
some dismissed him as an intellectual lightweight- someone who
simply parroted the views of his jurisprudential master, Justice An-
tonin Scalia.1 Court-watchers -intelligent and fair-minded ones,
anyway - finally recognize this attack as the unfair caricature that it
is. Even scholars who disagree with Justice Thomas now admit that,
on important issues ranging from the proper scope of congressional
power under the Commerce Clause2 to the constitutionality of af-
firmative action, 3 Justice Thomas has written thought-provoking,
carefully reasoned opinions.
4
'See generally Stephen F. Smith, A Tribute to Justice Clarence Thomas: The Truth about
Justice Thomas and the Need for New Black Leadership, 12 REGENT U. L. REv. 513, 514-15
(2000).
2 See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584-602 (1995) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring).
3 See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 349-78 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
4 Consider, for example, a recent discussion of Justice Thomas's Grutter dissent by
Tomiko Brown-Nagin. Tomiko Brown-Nagin, The "Transformative Racial Politics" of
Justice Thomas?: The Grutter v. Bollinger Opinion, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 787 (2005).
Although she disagrees with many of his positions, particularly on civil rights, Pro-
fessor Brown-Nagin finds much to praise about his dissent: "Justice Thomas's dis-
cussion of affirmative action has more depth and breadth than the utilitarian justifi-
cation for race-conscious policies offered by the University [of Michigan] and em-
braced in the majority opinion. Justice Thomas offers a racial critique of law school
admissions criteria and opens the door to an argument that universities' knowing
reliance on criteria that systematically favor whites should be understood as a form
of discrimination that is cognizable and remediable at law. In this way, Justice Tho-
mas expresses a 'transformative' politics on the issue of access to elite law school
education." Id. at 792.
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The opinions of Justice Thomas reflect a jurisprudence that is
uniquely his own. His well-known commitment to textualism and
originalism combines with a weak commitment to stare decisis on
constitutional questions. This often puts Thomas at odds with Jus-
tice Scalia and other Justices who are far more willing to defer to
precedents with which they disagree. 5 The most distinctive aspect
of Thomas's jurisprudence, however, involves cases of particular
concern to black Americans. In these cases, his originalism and
textualism are powerfully supplemented by another -ism-
namely, "black nationalism."
Throughout his tenure, Justice Thomas has repeatedly explored
the implications of controversial rulings for black Americans. This
might seem obvious in cases involving issues that are fundamen-
tally about race, such as the constitutionality of affirmative action 6
or race-based jury strikes. 7 In fact, however, it is not so obvious. Af-
ter all, other Justices who vote with him on matters involving race
typically eschew claims that their positions advance the interests of
blacks. Justice Thomas, by contrast, frequently (if not invariably)
seeks to demonstrate that his conservative positions on matters of
race are beneficial for black Americans, as well as legally required.
Even in cases that are not, strictly speaking, about race- an example
is whether allowing school vouchers to be used at religious schools
5 As one commentator has explained: "[Tihe Justice who urged the overruling of
constitutional precedents more than any other was Clarence Thomas, who on aver-
age has urged only overruling 2.07 constitutional precedents per Term (from the date
of his appointment to the end of the Rehnquist Court). It is plausible that, given Jus-
tice Thomas's frequently expressed commitment to original meaning, he is probably
at odds with more than two constitutional precedents he is called upon to review per
Term; but he does not urge the overruling of every precedent he deems wrongly
decided. The other Justices, including Justice Scalia, vote to overrule precedent urg-
ing overruling only once per Term. None of these Justices appear to be strongly dis-
posed to overrule many precedents." Michael J. Gerhardt, The Irrepressibility of Prece-
dent, 86 N.C. L. Rev. 1279, 1286 (2008) (footnotes omitted). On Thomas's judicial phi-
losophy, see infra note 132 and accompanying text.
6 See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. 306; Adarand Constructors v. Pefa, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
7 See, e.g., Snyder v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 1203 (2008); Georgia v. McCollum, 505
U.S. 42 (1992).
20091
586 New York University Journal of Law & Liberty [Vol. 4:583
violates the separation of church and state8 - he is quick to point out
the potential impact on blacks where he perceives it. Thus, it is false
to say, as many of Thomas's critics in the black community do, that
Justice Thomas "thinks white" 9 and has forgotten that he is black.
To anyone who cares to listen, Justice Thomas's opinions thunder
with the strong black-nationalist voice typically associated with one
of Thomas's personal heroes, Malcolm X.10 Like Malcolm X, Justice
Thomas categorically rejects the idea that white racism remains an
insurmountable obstacle to meaningful black progress in America.
Although racism unquestionably exists, enormous progress has been
made in American race relations -progress that was dramatically
confirmed last year by the election of Barack Obama as the nation's
first black president. In this climate, with legal protections against
discrimination finally enshrined into law after generations of struggle
and suffering, blacks need not look to race-based remedies or prefer-
ential treatment from society in order to succeed. They need only
look within, to the genius, creativity, and capacity for hard work that
resides in the heart and mind of every black person.
So, if we care to know who the "unknown" Justice Thomas is,
the answer is as provocative as it is obvious from his opinions. He
is, quite simply, Clarence X- a jurist who is not only a constitution-
alist, but a black nationalist as well.
I. BLACK NATIONALISM AND MALCOLM X
Given the negative connotations associated with some under-
standings of "black nationalism," it is important to be precise about
what exactly is, and is not, intended by the phrase here. In the classi-
cal sense of the term, black nationalism rests on the intractable racism
of whites. Because they believed whites will always be hostile to the
8 See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
9 See, e.g., Brown-Nagin, supra note 4, at 787 (noting such attacks against Thomas).
10 In a 1987 interview with Reason magazine, Thomas disclaimed the "antiwhite
rhetoric" of Malcolm X but admitted he is "very partial to Malcolm X, particularly
his self-help teaching." Bill Kaufman, Clarence Thomas, REASON, Nov. 1987, available at
http://www.reason.com/news/show/33217.html. Thomas added that he "ha[s]
virtually all of the recorded speeches of Malcolm X." Id.
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interests of blacks, Marcus Garvey and other classical black national-
ists believed that blacks could survive and prosper only by separat-
ing themselves from white society and forming their own nations -
nations of black people, by black people, and for black people.11 To-
day, few American blacks, least of all Justice Thomas, embrace black
nationalism in this classical sense.
In recent decades, black nationalism has acquired a broader al-
ternative meaning. Instead of preaching nationhood or physical
separation of the races, modem black nationalists recognize that
"'self-help' and 'self-determination"' are potent means through
which black communities can be empowered within white-
dominated societies. 12 Modern black nationalists contend that even
in the face of white racism, blacks can succeed by getting a good
education, avoiding self-defeating behavior like substance abuse
and crime, forming stable family structures, and creating economic
opportunities for themselves and other blacks-in short, by self-
consciously investing in themselves and their own communities.13
Malcolm X, at various times, advanced both conceptions of black
nationalism. Toward the end of his association with the Nation of
Islam and its controversial founder, Elijah Muhammad, Malcolm X
11 Wilson Jeremiah Moses, noted scholar of black nationalism, defines "[cilassical
black nationalism" as "an ideology whose goal was the creation of an autonomous
black nation-state, with definite geographical boundaries -usually in Africa."
WILLIAM JEREMIAH MOSES, CLASSICAL BLACK NATIONALISM: FROM THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION TO MARCUS GARVEY 1 (1996). According to Moses, classical black na-
tionalism in the United States arose in the 1700s, peaked in 1850 and again in 1920,
and has faded away since the 1920s. Id. at 1-6.
12Id. at 1.
13 As one commentator explains:
In the 1960s, black nationalists began to conceive of their project not as
geographic separation from whites, but rather as the dismantling of the
power relations between white and black communities. Instead of the
choices appearing as either integration and assimilation on the one hand,
or total geographic separation on the other, 1960s nationalists, led most no-
tably by Malcolm X, developed a "third" way that combined militant en-
gagement with the white power structure with the racial solidarity and
anti-assimilationism traditionally associated with nationalism.
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gave a fiery speech referring to America as the "last stronghold of
white supremacy" -a society destined to be "engulfed by the black
flames" of the "black revolution." 14 The "only permanent solution" to
America's race problem, Malcolm X insisted, "is the complete separa-
tion of these twenty-two million ex-slaves from our white slave mas-
ter, and the return of these ex-slaves to our own land, where we can
then live in peace and security among our people."' 5
This Malcolm frequently had harsh words for traditional civil
rights leaders. In his "Chickens Come Home to Roost" speech, for
example, he referred to them as "modem Negro magicians" who
seek to "make our people think that integration into this doomed
white society will soon solve our problem."16 Malcolm X went on to
make his point even more explicit:
Politically the American Negro is nothing but a football and the
white liberals control this mentally dead ball through tricks of to-
kenisn: false promises of integration and civil rights. In this prof-
itable game of deceiving and exploiting the politics of the Ameri-
can Negro, those white liberals have the willing cooperation of
the Negro civil rights leaders. These "leaders" sell out our people
for just a few crumbs of token recognition and token gains. These
"leaders" are satisfied with token victories and token progress
because they themselves are nothing but token leaders.17
At other points, particularly after he broke with the Nation of Islam,
Malcolm X articulated a distinctly less hostile (but equally revolutionary)
version of black nationalism. For example, in 1964, after his life-changing
pilgrimage to Mecca, he disclaimed "sweeping indictments of one race,"
Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DUKE L.J. 758, 831.
14 Malcolm X, God's Judgment of White America (Dec. 4, 1963) (emphasis added),
available at http://www.blackcommentator.com/42/42-Malcolm.html. The speech is
popularly known as the "Chickens Come Home to Roost" speech because, in re-
sponse to a question about the speech, Malcolm X used that phrase in reference to




declaring that "I am not a racist" and that "I wish nothing but freedom,
justice and equality: life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness-for all
people." 18 Nevertheless, Malcolm X remained convinced that self-
reliance was the only path to life, liberty, and happiness for blacks. As he
explains in his famous memoirs:
The American black man should be focusing his every effort
toward building his own businesses, and decent homes for
himself. As other ethnic groups have done, let the black peo-
ple, wherever possible, however possible, patronize their own
kind, hire their own kind, and start in those ways to build up
the black race's ability to do for itself. That's the only way the
American black man is ever going to get respect.1 9
The implications of this provocative passage (and others like it)
were not lost on a younger Clarence Thomas looking for footing
during the turbulence of the Reagan Administration's battles on
civil rights. In Malcolm X, Thomas had discovered that black pro-
gress was not something to be despaired of in America or conferred
by white society in its beneficence. Instead, the proper lesson to be
drawn from Malcolm X was that the black community itself has the
keys to its own progress: by becoming self-reliant and self-
sufficient, blacks can succeed on their own, regardless of how
whites might feel about them. As Thomas would later explain in his
memoirs: "I never went along with the militant separatism of the
Black Muslims, but I admired their determination to 'do for self,
brother,' as well as their discipline and dignity.... [T]o be truly free
and participate fully in American life, poor blacks had to have the
17 Id.
18 MALCOLM X SPEAKS: SELECTED SPEECHES AND STATEMENTS 58-59 (George Breit-
man ed., Grove Press, Inc. 1990) (1965).
19 
MALCOLM X & ALEX HALEY, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MALCOLM X 275 (2d ed.,
Ballantine Books 1999) (1964).
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tools to do for themselves." 20 Through discoveries such as these,
Clarence Thomas was well on his way to becoming Clarence X.2
1
II. CLARENCE THOMAS AS CLARENCE X
It did not take long for Justice Thomas's black nationalism to
appear in the pages of the United States Reports. From the very be-
ginning, he staked out a unique position on the Supreme Court. His
was more than just another conservative vote, more than a conser-
vative vote cast by a Justice who happened to be black. His was a
black conservative vote, in the sense that his conservatism was closely
linked to, perhaps even an outgrowth of, his blackness. Contrary to
the usual accusation that Thomas is uninterested in race, if not hos-
tile to the interests of blacks, Thomas's record reveals a Justice who,
like Malcolm X before him, approaches racial issues from black-
nationalist premises and is willing to think far more broadly about
issues of racial justice than many in the civil rights community
would prefer.
The black nationalism of Justice Thomas-of Clarence X-
would influence his judicial record in interesting ways. Sometimes,
it would lead him closer to positions favored by traditional civil-
rights groups than other conservative Justices. Other times, it would
push him to the far right of the Court, farther than even some of his
most conservative colleagues would go. Regardless of where Tho-
mas ended up in particular cases, it is clear that Thomas's brand of
20 CLARENCE THOMAS, MY GRANDFATHER'S SON: A MEMOIR 62 (2007). As Chairman
of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Thomas made the following
statement in a wide-ranging 1987 interview with Washington Post columnist Juan
Williams: "The issue is economics-not who likes you.... I don't see how the
civil-rights people today can claim Malcolm X as one of their own. Where does he
say black people should go begging the Labor Department for jobs? He was hell on
integrationists. Where does he say you should sacrifice your institutions to be next to
white people?" Juan Williams, A Question of Fairness, THE ATLANTIc, Feb. 1987, at 73.
21 Of course, the seeds for Thomas's intellectual development do not lie solely in
Malcolm X. They were first sown down on the farm in Pinpoint, Georgia, during the
height of Jim Crow, where Thomas and his brother learned the transformative value
of hard work and a good education from their grandfather (who famously pro-
claimed "Old Man Can't is dead -I helped bury him"). See THOMAS, supra note 20, at
12-28.
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judicial conservatism, infused as it is with black nationalism, differs
considerably from that of even his ideologically closest white col-
leagues.
A. CLARENCE X CONFRONTS WHITE SUPREMACY AND DEFENDS
BLACK INSTITUTIONS
In several cases, Justice Thomas has presented black-nationalist
arguments in defense of positions that would resonate with many
in the black community. Three are worth special mention here:
Dawson v. Delaware,22 Virginia v. Black,23 and United States v. Ford-
ice.24 The first two cases involved criminal prosecutions of white
supremacists; the third, Fordice, was a higher-education desegrega-
tion case.
1. White supremacy
Dawson arose in Thomas's very first Term on the Supreme Court.
In that case, a white man charged with capital murder sought to
avoid the death penalty by proving good character. His character
evidence involved testimony as to his kindheartedness (toward rela-
tives, at least) and his membership in Alcoholics Anonymous and
other groups that show good character. The prosecution sought to
rebut this evidence by proving the fact, admitted by Dawson himself,
that he was a member of the Aryan Brotherhood, a violent white-
supremacist prison gang. The jury evidently agreed that persons of
good character would not join such a disreputable group and saw no
grounds for leniency. The resulting death sentence was upheld
through the state system.
With Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist writing for the major-
ity, the Supreme Court reversed Dawson's death sentence. In the
Court's view, the state's use of Dawson's membership in a white-
supremacist group, even one as notorious and violent as the Aryan
- 503 U.S. 159 (1992).
- 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
24 505 U.S. 717 (1992).
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Brotherhood, as justification for a death sentence violated the First
Amendment. As Rehnquist put it, "the evidence proved nothing
more than Dawson's abstract beliefs."25
Justice Thomas was the lone dissenter in Dawson. With a touch
of sarcasm, Thomas argued that "the Aryan Brotherhood does not
exist merely to facilitate formulation of abstract racist thoughts, but
to 'respon[d]' to gangs of racial minorities." 26 The Aryan Brother-
hood, he noted, "is 'a singularly vicious prison gang"' that "has a
'hostility to black inmates"' and "originated 'during the prison ra-
cial violence of the 1960's."'27
Given the Aryan Brotherhood's well-known record of racially
motivated violence, it struck Thomas as illogical to say that evi-
dence of membership in that group is impermissible at a capital
sentencing hearing. He wrote: "Membership in Alcoholics Anony-
mous might suggest a good character, but membership in the Aryan
Brotherhood just as surely suggests a bad one."28 If defendants can
seek to avoid a death sentence with proof of membership in church
2 Dawson, 503 U.S. at 167. The majority did concede, however, that evidence of
constitutionally protected associations could be used to support a death sentence if
relevant to an aggravating circumstance (as in a racially motivated crime) or to dem-
onstrate future dangerousness. Id. at 166-67. The problem in Dawson was that the
evidence was irrelevant and thus served no purpose other than to inflame the pas-
sions of the jury. See id.
26 Id. at 173 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
27 Dawson, 503 U.S. at 173 n.1 (quoting United States v. Fountain, 840 F.2d 509, 516 (7th
Cir. 1988); United States v. Silverstein, 732 F.2d 1338,1341 (7th Cir. 1984); United States v.
Mills, 704 F.2d 1553, 1555 (11th Cir. 1983)). Thomas's assessment was later confirmed by
the federal government's path-breaking 110-page indictment and eventual conviction of
Aryan Brotherhood leaders in the Central District of California for what the sentencing
judge described as the group's "'well over 30 years of murder and organizational mur-
der,'" including the murder and attempted murder of black prisoners. Associated Press,
Prison Aryans Are Sentenced to Life Terms, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2006. Although charges
remained pending as to more than a dozen other defendants, with almost two dozen
more already having pled guilty, several of the leaders received consecutive life sentences.
Id.. See generally Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Leaders of Aryan Brotherhood's Fed-
eral Faction Convicted of Racketeering and Murder Offenses I (Sept. 15, 2006) (noting that
the Aryan Brotherhood leaders in California had "order[ed] a white-on-black race war
that led to the death of two inmates in a Pennsylvania penitentiary"), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/cac/pressroom/pr2006/121.html.
2 Id. at 175.
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and other groups suggestive of good character, it is only fair to al-
low the state to round out the picture for the jury by proving mem-
bership in groups, such as violent white-supremacist gangs, that
suggest bad character. The majority was able to hold otherwise,
Thomas argued, only by "bend[ing] traditional concepts of rele-
vance to exempt the antisocial."29
A decade later, the Court returned to the explosive issue of
white supremacy in Virginia v. Black.30 The case presented two
criminal prosecutions involving the infamous symbol of the Ku
Klux Klan: the burning cross. In one, a Klan leader burned a cross at
a Klan rally on private property, in full view of neighboring home-
owners and a nearby highway; in the other, white teenagers in-
volved in a dispute with the black family next door sought revenge
by burning a cross in the black family's yard.31 The cross-burners
were convicted under a state statute that made it a crime to bum a
cross "with intent to intimidate."32 The state supreme court invali-
dated the statute on free-speech grounds, and the Supreme Court
accepted the case for review.
The Virginia chapter of the National Association for the Ad-
vancement of Colored People ("NAACP") did not mince words in
condemning the state court's decision that cross-burning is pro-
tected speech. In a press release denouncing the Virginia court's
decision as "reminiscent" of state court decisions that upheld segre-
gation and trampled on the rights of civil rights protestors, the state
chapter stated:
29 Id. at 174. Thomas astutely saw through the charade of the majority's opinion: if,
as the majority contended, the Aryan Brotherhood evidence was irrelevant, then so
was the First Amendment issue. If Dawson was sentenced to death based on irrele-
vant evidence, the appropriate constitutional right would be the due process right to
a fair sentencing hearing, not the right to free speech and association. The only value
the First Amendment would add in Dawson's case would be to afford a ground for
excluding associational evidence that is relevant (and thus admissible), but the ma-
jority insisted the evidence was totally irrelevant. See id. at 178-80.
- 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
31 Id. at 348-50.
32 Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-423 (1996).
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The NAACP is dismayed at the absurd result reached in
Black, that the convictions of two men found guilty of enter-
ing on the property of another without permission; and
burning a cross on his property with the intent to intimi-
date him were reversed under the guise of protecting the
free speech rights secured under the First Amendment.
Such decisions desecrate the sanctity of First Amendment
protection when purposefully pitted against equally sacred
protections such as the safety of the citizenry.. .. 33
The most important condemnation did not come from the state
chapter; it came from Susan Jubilee. It was a pregnant Mrs. Jubilee
who awoke with her family to find a burned cross in their yard.
34
She left no doubt about what she thought of their neighbors' das-
tardly act: "It's not free speech. It's a form of terrorism .... It was
done to terrorize us so we would move out. And it did that."
35
Justice Thomas's keen interest in the case was evident when the
case came up for argument in the Supreme Court. Departing from
his usual practice of listening instead of questioning lawyers at oral
argument, Thomas surprised colleagues and court-watchers alike
by asking a series of provocative questions. 36 Speaking with un-
usual authority derived from his youth in the Deep South under
threat of racially motivated violence at the hands of Klansmen and
other white supremacists, Thomas chided the Deputy Solicitor Gen-
eral for minimizing the virulence of the burning cross. In Thomas's
view, the "reign of terror" by the Klan shows that burning a cross is
necessarily a threat "intended to cause fear" of imminent violence,
33 Press Release, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(Nov. 9, 2001). The head of the Virginia General Assembly's Black Caucus likewise
criticized the state court for extending free speech protection to behavior as "repug-
nant" as burning a cross. Jon Frank, Cross-Burning Law Overturned in a 4-3 Ruling,
Judges Call Such Acts a Protected Form of Free Speech, VA. PILOT & LEDGER, Nov. 3, 2001,
at Al (quoting Del. Jerrauld C. Jones (D-Norfolk)).
3
4 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
35 Id. The Jubilee family moved away within months of the cross-burning. Id.
36 See Linda Greenhouse, An Intense Attack by Justice Thomas on Cross-Burning, N.Y.
TIMEs, Dec. 12, 2002, at Al.
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not the expression of a viewpoint.37 The consensus seems to be that
Thomas's line of questioning changed the course of the argument. 3
8
The Supreme Court eventually held that cross-burning can con-
stitute protected speech. In doing so, however, Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor was careful to heed the lessons learned from Justice
Thomas. She began her analysis with a lengthy section recounting
the history of violence and racial terror associated with the burning
cross.39 As she read it, history amply demonstrated that "few if any
messages are more powerful" than a burning cross and that "of-
ten" - but "not inevitably" - "the cross burner intends that the re-
cipients of the message fear for their lives." 40 In order for the act of
burning a cross to be treated as a "true threat" -one that enjoys no
First Amendment protection-the state must prove that the cross-
burner acted with intent to intimidate and inspire fear.41 Absent
such proof, cross-burning is protected speech, no different in prin-
ciple from burning the American flag.
Only one Justice voted to uphold the law in its entirety. That was
Justice Thomas, who filed a solo opinion. Vigorously dissenting from
the Court's judgment, he would have upheld the statute in its en-
tirety (and the cross-burning convictions) against First Amendment
attack. As his comments at oral argument had indicated, he found the
history of cross-burnings to be dispositive. In American culture, he
37 Transcript of Oral Argument at 20, Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2002) (No. 01-
1107).
3 Linda Greenhouse, for example, reported that the Court's "mood appeared to
change" after Thomas's vigorous questioning. Greenhouse, supra note 36, at Al. See
generally Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Using the Master's "Tool" to Dismantle His House:
Why Clarence Thomas Makes the Case for Affirmative Action, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 113, 146-47
(2005) (demonstrating how Thomas's questioning caused other Justices to ask ques-
tions suggesting that the burning cross is a unique symbol of racial violence).
39 Black, 538 U.S. at 352-58.
40 Id. at 357.
41 Id. at 363. In a part of her opinion that garnered only plurality support, Justice
O'Connor concluded that the Virginia law unconstitutionally allowed juries to pre-
sume the necessary intent to intimidate from the simple act of burning a cross. The
presumption threatened to suppress free speech by "mak[ing] it more likely that the
jury will find an intent to intimidate regardless of the particular facts of the case." Id.
at 365 (plurality opinion).
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wrote, "cross burning has almost invariably meant lawlessness and
understandably instills in its victims well-grounded fear of physical
violence." 42 Thus, for him, burning a cross was simply "a physical
threat."
43
Justice Thomas did not quote Mrs. Jubilee. He did, however,
quote another black mother who had endured a similar attack:
After the mother saw the burning cross, she was crying on
her knees in the living room. [She] felt feelings of frustration
and intimidation and feared for her husband's life. She testi-
fied what the burning cross symbolized to her as a black
American: "Nothing good. Murder, hanging, rape, lynching.
Just anything bad that.., could happen to a person."44
For Thomas, the virulent effect that witnessing a burning cross has
for blacks permits legislatures to proscribe cross-burning without
proof of intent to intimidate (which, in any event, Thomas thought
could properly be inferred from the act of burning the cross). Tho-
mas concluded: "just as one cannot bum down someone's house to
make a political point and then seek refuge in the First Amendment,
those who hate cannot terrorize and intimidate to make their
point."
45
2. Higher-education desegregation and historically black schools
In United States v. Fordice,46 the Court reviewed the sufficiency
of Mississippi's efforts to dismantle its dual system of higher educa-
tion. During the Jim Crow era, blacks could not attend the Univer-
sity of Mississippi ("Ole Miss") and several other flagship public
colleges and universities; blacks could get a college education, at
42 Id. at 391 (Thomas, J., dissenting). See generally id. at 391-94 (discussing history of
cross-burnings in Virginia).
43 Id. at 400.
44 Id. at 390-91 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Skill-
man, 922 F.2d 1370,1378 (9th Cir. 1991)).
45 Id. at 394.
- 505 U.S. 717 (1992).
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public expense, only at Mississippi Valley State University and sev-
eral other all-black schools.47 Although Ole Miss was integrated in
1962, the Fordice litigation, which the federal government supported
as intervenor, claimed that Mississippi had race-neutral policies
that served to perpetuate the segregative effects of the prior race-
based admissions policies.48 The lower courts ruled that Mississippi
satisfied its constitutional obligation simply by adopting race-
neutral policies, deeming it irrelevant that black and white students
make choices about which schools to attend that maintain the ra-
cially identified character of the previously segregated schools.
49
The Supreme Court vacated and remanded. It was not enough,
in its view, simply to repeal race-based admissions policies. Absent
a "sound educational justification" for policies and practices "trace-
able to its prior de jure dual system that continue to foster segrega-
tion," the state's obligation is to "eradicate" all such policies and
practices.5 0 The mere fact of race-neutral admissions criteria and
student selection of where to apply and enroll did not justify the
state in retaining segregation-producing rules derived from the Jim
Crow era concerning admissions, program offerings, and other fac-
ets of university life. Out of concern that minimum test score re-
quirements and academic policies traceable to the de jure system
contributed to the continued segregation of the Mississippi system
of higher education, the Court remanded for further inquiry.
Justice Scalia dissented in part. He feared that the Court's deci-
sion might give states incentives to balance the racial composition
47 Id. at 721-22.
48 As the Supreme Court explained: "By the mid-1980s, 30 years after Brown [v.
Board of Education], more than 99 percent of Mississippi's white students were en-
rolled at University of Mississippi, Mississippi State, Southern Mississippi, Delta
State, and Mississippi University for Women. The student bodies at these universi-
ties remained predominantly white, averaging between 80 and 91 percent white
students. Seventy-one percent of the State's black students attended Jackson State,
Alcorn State, and Mississippi Valley State, where the racial composition ranged from
92 to 99 percent black."Fordice, 505 U.S. at 724-25.
49 Id. at 726-27.
50 Id. at 728; see also id. at 731 (ruling that "sound educational justification" is re-
quired for rules traceable to de jure segregation that continue to have segregative
effects).
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of their public universities. His larger criticism, however, was that
the decision would produce "years of litigation-driven confusion
and destabilization in the university systems of all the formerly de
jure States."
51
Justice Thomas did not join Justice Scalia's opinion but issued
his own concurrence. Where Scalia's concern was avoiding unnec-
essary uncertainty and dislocation for majority-white institutions,
Thomas saw a very different imperative: avoiding the potential
demise of historically black colleges and universities. Thomas ac-
cordingly began his opinion with the clarion call issued by W.E.B.
DuBois ninety years earlier: "'We must rally to the defense of our
schools."
52
Thomas worried that states might seek more complete integra-
tion of Ole Miss and other previously segregated institutions of
higher education by closing historically black colleges and universi-
ties. This result was not only unnecessary -everyone in Fordice
agreed with Justice Thomas that the Constitution "does not compel
the elimination of all observed racial imbalance," but only those
traceable to discrimination 53 -but would be most unfortunate as
well. In Thomas's view, historically black colleges and universities,
though born of white racism, "sustained blacks during segrega-
tion."54 Even after Jim Crow's demise, Thomas argued, the Court
properly left open the possibility that sound educational justifica-
tions support the continued availability of historically black colleges
and universities. After all, as suggested by their increasing enroll-
ment in the decades following Brown v. Board of Education,55 these
institutions instill "'pride'" in their graduates, train future genera-
tions of black leaders, and give "'hope to black families who want
the benefits of higher learning for their children.'" 56 They are, in
51 Id. at 762 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
52 Id. at 745 (Thomas, J., concurring).
3 Id.
54 Fordice, 505 U.S. at 749.
- 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
5 Fordice, 505 U.S. at 748 (quoting CARNEGIE COMM'N ON HIGHER EDUCATION,
FROM ISOLATION TO MAINSTREAM: PROBLEMS OF THE COLLEGES FOUNDED FOR
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short, "'key institutions for enhancing the general quality of the
lives of black Americans.' '5
7
Although a few commentators have recognized the black nation-
alism that undergirded Thomas's defense of historically black col-
leges and universities in Fordice,58 commentators have overlooked
another important aspect of his opinion in the case. In addition to
extolling the value of historically black colleges and universities for
students who choose them, Thomas also endorsed a fairly generous
standard for challenges to university policies traceable to the de jure
system. Whereas Justice Scalia argued that "[o]nly one aspect of a his-
torically segregated university system" - "discriminatory admissions
standards" -must "be eliminated," 59 Justice Thomas adopted a
broader view that extended the state's constitutional obligation to all
university policies, not just admissions standards, derived from the
de jure era.
60
Moreover, Thomas voted to make it easier to prove the discriminatory
intent necessary to challenge such policies on equal protection grounds. In
his view, proof of "present specific intent to discriminate" is unnecessary
because the requisite discriminatory intent can be "assume[d]" from the
fact that segregation-producing university policies were derived from
NEGROES 11 (1971) [hereinafter CARNEGIE COMM'N]). Justice Thomas quoted with
approval an author who contends that historically black colleges and universities
symbolize "the highest attainments of black culture." See id. (quoting JEAN L. PREER,
LAWYERS V. EDUCATORS: BLACK COLLEGES AND DESEGREGATION IN PUBLIC HIGHER
EDUCATION 2 (1982)).
57 Id. (quoting CARNEGIE COMM'N, supra note 56).
m See, e.g., Alex Johnson, Bid Whist, Tonk, and United States v. Fordice: hy Integra-
tionism Fails African-Americans Again, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1401, 1417-18 (1993); Mark
Tushnet, Clarence Thomas's Black Nationalism, 47 HOw. L.J. 323 (2004).
59 Fordice, 505 U.S. at 758 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissent-
ing in part) (emphasis added) (dismissing the broader view as "not just unprece-
dented, but illogical as well").
60 See, e.g., id. at 745 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("I agree with the Court that a State
does not satisfy its obligation to dismantle a dual system of higher education merely
by adopting race-neutral policies for the future administration of that system."); id. at
746 ("A challenged policy does not survive under the standard we announce today if
it began during the prior dejure era, produces adverse impacts, and persists without
sound educational justification.").
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prior periods of state-sponsored discrimination.61 Unable to defend such
policies on the ground that present intent to discriminate is lacking, the
only way states can retain those policies, on Thomas's view, is by shoul-
dering the burden of advancing a "sound educational justification" for
thein 62
Consequently, in Fordice, Justice Thomas did far more than
simply preserve the option of historically black colleges and univer-
sities for interested students. He also made it considerably easier for
black students to challenge policies that interfere with their ability
to attend previously all-white institutions of higher learning. The
high value that Thomas attached to historically black colleges and
universities, and his much-ballyhooed opposition to integration for
its own sake, thus did not in any way detract from his commitment
to nondiscrimination by public universities.
Dawson, Black, and Fordice are significant given the relentless at-
tacks on Justice Thomas. These cases show him powerfully decrying
anti-black racism, voting to protect blacks against discrimination by
government actors, and defending the proud heritage of historically
black colleges and universities. The outcomes he advocated in these
cases set him apart from other Justices, liberal and conservative alike.
Perhaps tellingly, in none of these cases did any other Justice sign on
to Thomas's opinions. To borrow a phrase from Malcolm X, these
opinions may have been "too black, too strong" for other Justices to
join- and, consequently, Thomas was free to speak his mind.63
61 Id.
62 Id. at 746.
63 The quoted phrase comes from a November 1963 speech in which Malcolm X
used coffee and cream as an analogy to integration and the destruction of autono-
mous black institutions. He said:
It's just like when you've got some coffee that's too black, which means it's
too strong. What do you do? You integrate it with cream, you make it
weak. But if you pour too much cream in it, you won't even know you
ever had coffee. It used to be hot, it becomes cool. It used to be strong, it
becomes weak. It used to wake you up, now it puts you to sleep.
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In their zeal to caricature Thomas as a conservative ideologue who is
indifferent or hostile to the interests of blacks, Thomas critics ignore
opinions in which Thomas strongly defended the interest of blacks. The
opinions are ignored because they disprove the false impression the crit-
ics seek to convey. The black nationalism in these decisions-their evi-
dent pride in autonomous black institutions committed to excellence and
willingness to confront white supremacy head on -is as undeniable as it
is underappreciated. These decisions reveal a Justice who is keenly
aware of white racism and sees continuing value for blacks, even after
the demise of de jure discrimination, in preserving the institutions that
nurtured and sustained generations of blacks in the face of white racism.
Thomas's reasoning and outcome in these decisions would undoubtedly
resonate with Malcolm X and the many other blacks who, whether they
accept the label or not, hold black nationalist views.
B. CLARENCE X DEFENDS CIVIL RIGHTS AGAINST TRADITIONAL
REMEDIES
As previously shown, Justice Thomas's black-nationalist instincts
have pushed him in the direction favored by many blacks and by
civil rights groups in several important cases. More often, however,
those instincts have pushed him in the opposite direction -and, as
one would expect, these are the decisions that Thomas critics (espe-
cially within the black community) emphasize. On issues such as af-
firmative action, 64 school desegregation, 65 redistricting, 66 and the
death penalty, 67 for example, Thomas has reached decidedly conser-
vative results. He has been mercilessly attacked ("demonized" would
be a more accurate description) as a result.
Malcolm X, Message to the Grass Roots (Nov. 10, 1963), in MALCOLM X SPEAKS:
SELECTED SPEECHES AND STATEMENTS 3-17, 16 (George Breitman ed., Grove Press
1990) (1965).
64 See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Ada-
rand Constructors v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
65 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2768-88
(2007) (Thomas, J., concurring); Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 114-38 (1995) (Tho-
mas, J., concurring).
6 Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 891-946 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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The most venomous of these attacks is that Thomas's views
mark him as nothing short of a "traitor" to his race. As one recent
account puts it:
Because authentic blackness has been socially constructed
as including progressive or liberal political ideology, con-
servative Blacks, such as black Republicans, are often
de-blacked in the eyes of the black community by their po-
litical ideology. For example, many Blacks and Whites per-
ceive Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas, a
dark-skinned Black who identifies himself as a black per-
son, as non-black, a sellout, an Uncle Tom, precisely be-
cause of his staunch political conservatism. The constructed
assumption on which these perceptions are based is that
true Blacks are not conservative, do not vote Republican,
and do not oppose affirmative action.68
Even Justice Thomas, who usually ignores even the most personal
of attacks, has admitted that he is saddened by accusations that he is
"selling out" or "betraying" his race. In a speech before an openly hos-
tile audience at a National Bar Association conference, he asserted his
"right to think for [him]self" and not have views assigned to him based
on skin color as if he were "an intellectual slave."69 Nevertheless, Tho-
mas offered the following unusually personal comments addressing
67 Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 478-500 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring).
68 Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Undercover Other, 94 CAL. L. REv. 873, 888 (2006) (footnotes
omitted). Randall Kennedy, a moderate who has had his own run-ins with liberal black
orthodoxy, exhaustively treats the idea of racial betrayal in SELLOUT: THE POLITICS OF
RACIAL BETRAYAL (2008). Professor Kennedy devotes an entire chapter to the attacks on
Justice Thomas and ultimately concludes that Thomas's conservative views on racial
issues are misguided but cannot fairly be deemed acts of racial treason. See id. at 87-143.
For a thorough refutation of the idea that conservatism is irreconcilable with blackness-
by a self-described "liberal black womanist," no less-see generally Angela Onwuachi-
Wilig, Just Another Brother on the SCT?: Wat Justice Clarence Thomas Teaches Us About the
Influence of Racial Identity, 90 IOWA L. REV. 931,939-63 (2005) (describing the long tradition,
past and present, of black conservatism).
69 Justice Clarence Thomas, Speech to the National Bar Association (July 28, 1998),
available at http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/ index.asp?document=507.
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accusations of racial betrayal: "It pains me deeply, or more deeply than
any of you can imagine, to be perceived by so many members of my
race as doing them harm. All the sacrifice, all the long hours of prepa-
ration were to help [the black community], not to hurt."
70
Whether one ultimately agrees with his positions or not (and, of
course, although many blacks hold similar positions,71 his views are
as contestable as the liberal black orthodoxy that has decreed his ex-
communication), the opinions Justice Thomas has written on the sub-
ject of race bear out his claim that he honestly believes his positions
would help, rather than hurt, blacks. Time and again, in rejecting re-
flexive adherence to traditional civil-rights remedies, Thomas has
asserted black nationalist reasons for doing so. His view is that those
remedies, though presented as necessary to the best interests of the
black community, actually serve to undermine those interests. Prop-
erly understood, Thomas contends, traditional civil-rights remedies
are too limited - and not nearly radical enough - to produce mean-
ingful gains for the black community in the conditions of today.72
70 Id.
71 As I have explained elsewhere:
Although only 8% of blacks surveyed consider themselves Republican ...
conservative views are, as a general matter, commonplace among blacks....
"85 percent [of blacks polled] support school choice. Fifty-three percent of
the black public disapprove of mandatory busing and 77 percent feel that
minorities should not receive preferential treatment to make up for past dis-
crimination (affirmative action)." ... With regard to the issue that, in reality,
drove much of the opposition to Justice Thomas's nomination-abortion-
recent polls find that only 36% of blacks are pro-choice, and no less than 48%
of blacks are pro-life, flatly opposing abortion under any circumstances.
Smith, supra note 1, at 534-35 (footnotes omitted) (citing opinion polling data).
More recent polling data focused on moral issues confirm that "there are major
gulfs between the attitudes of black Democrats and the attitudes of nonblack
Democrats," usually with "blacks com[ing] much closer to the positions of Re-
publicans than to those of Democrats." Frank Newport, Blacks as Conservative as
Republicans on Some Moral Issues, GALLuP, Dec. 3, 2008, available at
http://www.gallup.com/poll/112807/Blacks-Conservative-Republicans-Some-
Moral-Issues.aspx.
72 In viewing certain traditional civil-rights remedies as insufficient to accomplish
meaningful racial justice, the connection between Justice Thomas and Malcolm X could
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Thomas's most controversial opinions on matters involving
race neatly fit into this pattern. For the sake of brevity, I will focus
on his key opinions in three areas: public school desegregation,
non-educational affirmative action, and affirmative action in higher
education.
1. Public school desegregation
In Missouri v. Jenkins,73 the Court faced a challenge by the State of
Missouri to certain desegregation orders designed to render Kansas
City public schools more attractive to whites in the surrounding sub-
urbs. Kansas City schools had been under federal court supervision
since 1977, having been segregated by race under state law prior to
Brown v. Board of Education. Eighteen years later, efforts to achieve racial
integration within city schools were frustrated by so-called "white
flight," which left Kansas City schools 68.3% black.74 Lacking the au-
thority to reassign students between the majority-black city schools
and those of neighboring, majority-white school districts, the district
court sought to make the facilities and offerings in Kansas City schools
so attractive that white parents in the suburbs would elect to send their
children to school in the city. The State, however, balked at the re-
quirement that it provide the necessary $200 million per year for salary
increases and improvements in the city school system. 75
not be more obvious. Malcolm X dismissed integration itself as a "sellout" -"token
progress" that black leaders (and, of course, he would place mocking quotation marks
around the word "leaders") accept because "they themselves are nothing but token
leaders." Malcolm X, supra note 14. Rather than settle for a "few crumbs of token rec-
ognition and token progress" in the form of integration, id., Malcolm X urged blacks to
implement more radical solutions: "The first thing that the black man has got to do is
straighten out the evil conditions in New York City's Harlem and the other ghettos.
Not only materially, but morally and spiritually. We've got to get rid of drunkenness,
drug addiction, prostitution and all that. We need a program to educate the people of
Harlem to a better sense of values." Now It's a Negro Drivefor Segregation, U.S. NEws &
WORLD REP., Mar. 30, 1964 (interview with Malcolm X), available at
http://www.usnews.com/articles/news/2008/05/16/now-its-a-negro-drive-for-
segregation.html?PageNr=l.
515 U.S. 70 (1995).
74 Id. at 76.
75 Id. at 78-80.
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The Supreme Court agreed that the district court had exceeded
its proper remedial authority. The district court could not seek to
balance the racial composition of city and suburban schools because
the only constitutional violation found was segregation within Kan-
sas City schools. 76 The fact that city schools remained majority-
black, despite racially neutral assignment policies, was not uncon-
stitutional and did not justify efforts to attract more whites from
neighboring jurisdictions into city schools.
Justice Thomas joined the majority's opinion and filed a solo
concurrence. He began with a note of exasperation: "It never ceases
to amaze me that the courts are so willing to assume that anything
that is predominantly black must be inferior." 7 As "despicable" as
segregation was, there was no basis for believing that discrimina-
tion prior to Brown had anything to do with the racial composition
of Kansas City schools decades later.78 Consequently, the lengths to
which the district court went to bring whites into city schools im-
plied that black schoolchildren are harmed by the absence of white
classmates-in other words, "that any school that is black is infe-
rior, and that blacks cannot succeed without the benefit of the com-
pany of whites." 79
Thomas categorically rejected the idea that racial isolation itself
(as opposed to racial discrimination) is a source of harm to blacks.
Although Brown referred to the psychological injury that segrega-
tion caused black schoolchildren, the reference did not, in his view,
supply the ground for the decision. The decision rested on the
"simple, yet fundamental, truth that the government cannot dis-
criminate among its citizens on the basis of race."8 0 Moreover, it is
empirically false, Thomas argued, to posit that blacks cannot learn
76 Id. at 90.
77 Id. at 114 (Thomas, J., concurring).
78 Id. at 118.
79 Id. at 119.
so Id. at 120. Thomas added: "Segregation was not unconstitutional because it might
have caused psychological feelings of inferiority.... [Slegregation violated the Consti-
tution because the State classified students based on their race... [and] relegat[ed]
[black children] to schools with substandard facilities and resources." Id. at 121.
2009]
606 New York University Journal of Law & Liberty [Vol. 4:583
as well without whites and that blacks learn better with whites. De-
segregation "has not produced the predicted leaps forward in black
educational achievement" and, as with historically black colleges
and universities, "black schools can function as the center and sym-
bol of black communities, and provide examples of independent
black leadership, success, and achievement."8' Convinced that only
de jure segregation is unconstitutional, Thomas implored that we
"forever put aside the notion that simply because a school district
today is black, it must be educationally inferior."
8 2
The issue of school desegregation returned to the Court in Parents
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1.83 Unlike
Jenkins, the integration efforts in Parents Involved were voluntary in
nature, not aimed at remedying prior de jure segregation: Seattle
never had segregated schools, and the Louisville-area schools had
already eliminated the vestiges of their prior segregation. The school
districts sought to achieve greater racial balance in their schools by
taking into account the impact on the racial makeup of schools when
making transfer and certain other student-assignment decisions. A
group of white parents sued the school districts, arguing that the
school system had unconstitutionally denied their children place-
ments because of their race.
The Supreme Court ruled that the school districts' use of race
was unconstitutional. Although racial diversity serves a valid educa-
tional purpose in higher education, that rationale does not apply to
elementary and secondary schools.84 Moreover, even if there were
educational or social benefits from racial integration at the K-12 level
that might justify non-remedial, race-conscious assignment policies,
the school districts' policies were not narrowly tailored to the
achievement of those benefits. Rather, those policies amounted to
racial balancing for its own sake, an impermissible goal.85
81 Id. at 121-22.
82 Id. at 138.
83 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
84 See id. at 724-25.
8 Id. at 729-33.
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Justice Thomas filed yet another solo concurrence. He agreed
with the majority opinion in full but wrote separately to dispute the
dissent's claim that voluntary integration is an appropriate response
to the growing lack of racial diversity in public schools. Thomas ar-
gued that the dissent's claim rested on a misunderstanding of what
constitutes segregation. Racial imbalance resulting entirely from vol-
untary private choices about where to live or work "is not segrega-
tion" (or, for that matter, necessarily cause for concern), and only
governmental discrimination is properly remedied through desegre-
gation orders. 86 The dissent's contrary view, Thomas contended,
"would give school boards a free hand to make decisions on the basis
of race -an approach reminiscent of that advocated by the segrega-
tionists in Brown."
87
2. Non-educational affirmative action
Justice Thomas first confronted affirmative action in Adarand Con-
structors, Inc. v. Pe~ia,88 a case involving preferences for historically dis-
advantaged minorities in federal highway projects. A prior case, City of
Richmond v. l.A. Croson Co.,89 had ruled that all racial classifications by
government, even affirmative action programs benefiting minorities,
are subject to strict scrutiny. Croson, however, involved local govern-
mental preferences and thus did not address whether federal affirma-
tive action programs are also subject to strict scrutiny. A later ruling,
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission,90 con-
cluded that "benign" uses of race by the federal government are sub-
ject to a more lenient standard (intermediate scrutiny) than similar
state and local action under Croson. The basic question in Adarand was
86 Id. at 750 (Thomas, J., concurring). Thomas added that black children can excel
academically in majority-black schools and do not necessarily show academic gains
in racially integrated schools. See id. at 761-66 (citing studies of black achievement in
integrated and non-integrated settings).
87Id.
- 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
- 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
497 U.S. 547 (1990).
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whether Metro Broadcasting should be overruled and the holding of
Croson extended to federal affirmative action programs.
Convinced that strict scrutiny should apply to all governmental
racial distinctions, the Supreme Court overruled Metro Broadcasting.
Metro Broadcasting was a sharp break from forty years of precedent
establishing that the federal government has no greater license to
discriminate among citizens on racial grounds than state and local
governments.91 Moreover, by distinguishing between "benign" and
"malign" uses of race, Metro Broadcasting undermined the estab-
lished principle that all persons, not just members of minority
groups, have the right to equal protection.92 Thus, "[f]ederal racial
classifications, like those of a State, must serve a compelling gov-
ernmental interest, and must be narrowly tailored to further that
interest."93
Justice Thomas concurred separately. He agreed that "there is
[no] racial paternalism exception to the principle of equal protec-
tion," adding that "racial paternalism and its unintended conse-
quences can be as poisonous and pernicious as any other form of
discrimination." 94 Harkening back to the "stigma" rationale of
Brown v. Board of Education,95 he wrote that racial preferences
"stamp minorities with a badge of inferiority."96 Such preferences
also "engender attitudes of superiority or, alternatively, provoke
resentment among those who believe they have been wronged by
the government's use of race." 97 Ultimately, in his view, whether
racial distinctions are intended to help or hurt minorities, "it is race
discrimination, plain and simple."98
Thomas added that, despite their stated purpose of benefiting
minorities, race-based affirmative action rests on two fundamentally
9" Adarand, 515 U.S. at 226-27.
92 Id. at 227-30.
9Id. at 235.
94 Id. at 240-41 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
- 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
96 Adarand, 515 U.S. at 240 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
97 Id. at 241.
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misguided premises. One premise of affirmative action programs is
that "minorities cannot compete with [whites] without their patroniz-
ing indulgence." 99 The other premise of such programs, when im-
plemented by government, is that government can and should com-
pensate for the supposed inability of minorities to compete with
whites. Thomas emphatically disagreed with both premises: "Gov-
ernment cannot make us equal; it can only recognize, respect, and
protect us as equal before the law" -which it does not do by having
programs that treat minorities as unable to compete with whites on
equal terms.100
3. Affirmative action in higher education
Eight years later, the Court returned to the issue that had deeply
divided it in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke:101 the con-
stitutionality of affirmative action in university admissions. This time,
the University of Michigan was the target. White applicants who had
been denied admission to the undergraduate and law schools filed
class actions challenging the schools' affirmative action plans, which
allowed minorities to be admitted with considerably lower grades
and standardized test scores than whites. The lower courts, relying
on Justice Lewis F. Powell's opinion in Bakke, upheld Michigan's af-
firmative action plans as permissible means of achieving educational
diversity. The cases came to the Court in Gratz v. Bollinger'°2 and
Grutter v. Bollinger.33
Gratz involved the undergraduate affirmative action plan,
which used a points system to determine who would and would
not be admitted. All applicants would receive a certain number of
points for academic factors, standardized test scores, extracurricular
activities, and other neutral factors (including in-state residence and
98ld.
99Id.
100 Id. at 240.
10 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (striking down racial quotas and set-asides in public univer-
sity admissions).
102 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
103 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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legacy status). 10 4 Members of underrepresented racial or ethnic
groups, however, were automatically assigned twenty additional
points -one-fifth of the points necessary to guarantee admission -
and, consequently, virtually every qualified minority applicant was
admitted.105
In Gratz, the Supreme Court struck down the undergraduate
plan. Applying strict scrutiny, the majority held that the under-
graduate plan was not narrowly tailored to achieve educational di-
versity. Although race can serve as a "plus factor" in admissions
under Bakke, the large number of points associated with minority
status "has the effect of making 'the factor of race.., decisive' for
virtually every minimally qualified underrepresented minority ap-
plicant." 106 This, wrote Chief Justice Rehnquist, is the antithesis of
the "individualized consideration" that Bakke requires. 10 7 To be con-
stitutional, admissions officers must "consider[] each particular ap-
plicant as an individual, assessing all of the qualities that individual
possesses, and in turn, evaluating that individual's ability to con-
tribute to the unique setting of higher education."
10 8
Justice Thomas concurred to identify two further defects in the
undergraduate affirmative action plan. First, the plan treated all mem-
bers of underrepresented minority groups as essentially fungible- that
is, as equally able to contribute to the University's diversity. This
treatment was unjustified because it "does not sufficiently allow for the
consideration of nonracial distinctions among underrepresented mi-
nority applicants." 10 9 Second, in denying persons outside of those
groups the twenty points that minorities receive on diversity grounds,
the plan ignored the possibility that persons other than underrepre-
sented minorities could contribute to Michigan's diversity on grounds
other than race. In Thomas's view, an admissions policy "must allow
104 Gratz, 539 U.S. at 255.
105 See id. at 255-57.
106 Gratz, 539 U.S. at 272.
107 Id. at 271.
108 Id,
109 Id. at 281 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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for consideration of these nonracial distinctions among applicants on
both sides of the single permitted racial classification."" 0
The law school's affirmative action plan, at issue in Grutter, was
less rigid than the undergraduate school's. It, too, was intended to
produce diversity, but did not define diversity solely in terms of
race or ethnicity. Although the plan sought to guarantee that a
"critical mass" of underrepresented minorities would be admitted,
members of other groups had the opportunity to demonstrate that
they would contribute to the law school's diversity."' All aspects of
every applicant's file (including the Law School Admissions Test, or
LSAT, score) were reviewed in an effort to assemble a highly quali-
fied, diverse class of students with substantial promise in the field
of law.1
1 2
In an opinion written by Justice O'Connor, the Supreme Court
held that the law school's affirmative action plan satisfied strict scru-
tiny. In the context of higher education, diversity is a compelling inter-
est, and Michigan's view that diversity is vital to its academic mission
(because diversity enriches the classroom experience and promotes
cross-racial understanding) was entitled to deference. 113 The law
school's plan was narrowly tailored to the goal of achieving the educa-
tional benefits associated with diversity. Without affirmative action,
few underrepresented minorities would be admitted, and the educa-
tional benefits associated with having a "critical mass" of underrepre-
sented minorities would be lost. Unlike the undergraduate plan invali-
dated in Gratz, the law school's plan was not equivalent to a quota or
set-aside: every applicant could attempt to demonstrate that he would
contribute to the diversity of the entering class, and every applicant's
file received "highly individualized, holistic review.""
4
Justice Thomas dissented. After a striking quotation from Freder-
ick Douglas that what blacks want from whites "is not benevolence,
110 Id.
111 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 315-16.
112 Id. at 337-39.
113 Id. at 328-29.
114 Id. at 337.
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not pity, not sympathy, but simply justice," Thomas asserted his be-
lief that "blacks can achieve in every avenue of American life without
the meddling of university administrators."115 That would be true at
Mlichigan's law school as well, except for the fact that, in order to
maintain its reputation as an elite school, the law school "maintains
an exclusionary admissions system that it knows produces racially
disproportionate results."11 6 The lack of diversity that would result at
the law school in the absence of racial preferences is merely a
"self-inflicted wound[] of this elitist admissions policy," not a justifi-
cation for racial double standards in admissions.117
Although Thomas reiterated his familiar arguments from Ada-
rand about the stigma and other harms that racial preferences inflict
on their "beneficiaries," he offered at least three broader, more radical
critiques of race-based affirmative action.
First, the definition of "merit" at elite law schools is unduly nar-
row. Elite law schools use the LSAT and other quantitative measures to
predict academic performance in law school, when, in fact, they should
employ more flexible standards that "give[] every applicant a chance to
prove he can succeed in the study of law."11 8 It is only because the
standards that determine qualification for admission to elite law
schools are so rigid that elite schools require exceptions to merit-based
admission for minorities, legacies, and others.
Second, racial preferences in admissions benefit those least in
need of assistance -namely, the socioeconomically and educationally
advantaged. Such preferences "do[] nothing for those too poor or
uneducated to participate in elite higher education," groups Thomas
viewed as having more compelling claims for government assistance
1 Id. at 349-50 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
116 Id. at 350.
117 Id. For Thomas, the fact that Michigan could obtain diversity without racial
preferences by decreasing reliance on the LSAT, a test on which minorities are
known to underperform relative to whites, meant that Michigan's true interest was
not diversity. Rather, the interest was, at best, for Michigan to maintain its status as
an elite law school; at worst, the interest was racial balancing. The first is a legitimate
interest but not a compelling one, id. at 358-61; the second is flatly impermissible. Id.
at 355.
118 Id. at 367-68.
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to improve their station in life.119 To promote justice in a meaningful
way, preferential admissions policies should not use race as a proxy
for disadvantage but rather focus directly on "helping those who are
truly underprivileged." 120 Furthermore, despite preferential admis-
sions, black men were significantly underrepresented at Michigan,
and Michigan seemed entirely content with that lamentable situation.
A defensible affirmative action plan would address "real problems
like the crisis of black male underperformance."' 21
Third, race-based admissions policies are exploitative. Those
policies allow elite, majority-white schools to achieve a desired ra-
cial mix for their own self-serving purposes -purposes he derided
as "classroom aesthetics." 122 Those purposes are achieved at the
119 Id. at 354 n.3.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 372 n.11. Some of these "real problems" are documented in a recent report
by the National Urban League: "Ironically, even as an African-American man holds
the highest office in the country, African Americans remain twice as likely as whites
to be unemployed, three times more likely to live in poverty[,] and more than six
times as likely to be incarcerated. These statistics represent persistent inequalities
that have existed in American society for years .. " Valerie Rawlston Wilson, Intro-
duction to the 2009 Equality Index, in NAT'L URBAN LEAGUE, THE STATE OF BLACK
AMERICA 2009: MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT 15 (2009); see also, Marc H. Morial, From
the President's Desk, in id. at 11-12 (noting that "wide academic achievement gaps"
exist between blacks and whites and that "[flewer than 50 percent of African Ameri-
cans graduate from high school in many major American cities"). The problems are
even more pronounced when family structures are taken into account. The marriage-
based family structure is rapidly becoming a thing of the past in the black commu-
nity, with disastrous results for adults and especially children. As the Institute for
American Values notes in a recent report: "Between 1950 and 1996, the percentage of
Black families headed by married couples declined from 78 percent to 34 percent.
Between 1940 and 1990, the percentage of Black children living with both parents
dropped from 75.8 percent to 33.2 percent, largely because of increases in never-
married Black mothers .... Research shows that compared with children in single-
parent families, African American children living with their own married parents are
less likely to live in poverty, typically benefit from greater parental involvement, are
less delinquent, have higher self-esteem, are more likely to delay sexual activity,
have lower rates of teen pregnancy, and have better educational outcomes." Linda
Malone-Colon, Institute for American Values, Responding to the Black Marriage Crisis:
A New Vision for Change at 1-2 (Research Brief No.6, June 2007) (footnote omitted),
available at http://www.fatherhood.org/downloadable -files/IAVBrief6.pdf.
122 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 355 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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expense of the very minority students they purportedly benefit. He
explained:
The Law School tantalizes unprepared students with the
promise of a University of Michigan degree and all of the
opportunities that it offers. These overmatched students take
the bait, only to find that they cannot succeed in the cauldron
of competition. And this mismatch crisis is not restricted to
elite institutions. Indeed, to cover the tracks of the aestheti-
cists, this cruel farce of racial discrimination must continue -
in selection for the Michigan Law Review, and in hiring at law
firms and for judicial clerkships-until the "beneficiaries"
are no longer tolerated. While these students may graduate
with law degrees, there is no evidence that they have re-
ceived a qualitatively better legal education (or become bet-
ter lawyers) than if they had gone to a less "elite" law school
for which they were better prepared.1 23
In light of this "cruel farce," Thomas concluded that the law school
"seeks only a facade -it is sufficient that the class looks right, even
if it does not perform right."124
Although Justice Thomas's opinions in the desegregation and af-
firmative-action cases are used as Exhibit A in the case that he is a "trai-
tor" to his race, even cursory examination of those opinions tells a very
different story. The opinions reach outcomes that are fairly described as
"conservative," but they do so for black-nationalist reasons-the sort of
reasons that ought to resonate with many blacks and black activists even
if they ultimately disagree with the conclusions Thomas reaches. Tho-
mas asserts, as an article of faith, unshakeable confidence in the ability of
blacks and black institutions to succeed on their own initiative, without
123 Id. at 372 (citations omitted).
124 Id.
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what he regards as "racial paternalism" from whites.125 Because blacks
and black schools are not intrinsically inferior to whites and white
schools, there is simply no cause for alarm when, for a variety of reasons
unrelated to discrimination, many blacks attend majority-black schools
or do not attend elite, majority white institutions of higher learning. In-
deed, Thomas-in keeping with the movement for "Afro-centric"
schools126 -stresses the substantial benefits that black students can real-
ize, in the form of role models, self-confidence, and even test scores, in
majority-black schools -where black students succeed or fail on their
own, and their successes cannot be dismissed as the result of preferential
treatment.
Just as Malcolm X faulted the civil rights community for accept-
ing "token progress" in the form of integration in place of deeper so-
cial justice, 127 Justice Thomas's controversial opinions on race urge
more radical solutions to the problems facing black America today.
The problem with de facto black public schools, for example, is not
that they lack sufficient numbers of white faces in the classroom; the
problem is that poor black children are trapped in failing public
schools, unable by virtue of their poverty either to move to areas with
better schools or to pay tuition to attend higher-quality private
schools. Instead of reassigning students within a failing public school
system to achieve better racial balances, a better approach -one that
might actually help blacks by breaking the "vicious cycle of poverty,
dependence, criminality, and alienation" that too many poor black
children face -would be to give poor black families the same ability
that wealthy families have to send their children to private schools
instead of failing public schools. 128 Nevertheless, the civil-rights
125 Adarand Constructors v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 240 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment).
126 See, e.g., Eleanor Brown, Black Like Me? "Gangsta" Culture, Clarence Thomas, and
Afrocentric Academies, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 308 (2000).
127 See supra note 72.
128 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 683 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring). As
Thomas explained in Zelman:
[Flailing urban public schools disproportionately affect minority children
most in need of educational opportunity. At the time of Reconstruction,
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community opposes school vouchers even though school choice dis-
proportionately benefits blacks and the vast majority of blacks sup-
port school choice.
Race-based preferences for blacks in elite, majority-white colleges
and universities, in Thomas's view, are a poor substitute for society
fulfilling its fundamental obligation of providing all children, not just
the wealthiest (and the whitest), with an excellent education. Even if
racial preferences in admissions "benefit" minorities in some sense
(and Thomas, of course, believes they stigmatize minorities as inferior
to whites and put minorities in educational settings where they are
unlikely to succeed),129 the resulting benefit is typically available only
to wealthier, educationally advantaged minorities who are bound for
college and post-graduate study (and therefore success) in any event.
Preferential admissions policies do nothing at all for the multitude of
blacks considered public education "a matter of personal liberation and a
necessary function of a free society." Today, however, the promise of pub-
lic school education has failed poor inner-city blacks. While in theory pro-
viding education to everyone, the quality of public schools varies signifi-
cantly across districts. Just as blacks supported public education during
Reconstruction, many blacks and other minorities now support school
choice programs because they provide the greatest educational opportuni-
ties for their children in struggling communities.
Id. at 681-82 (citation omitted).
129 The stigmatization Thomas finds inherent in race-based admissions policies re-
sults from such policies' reaffirmation of racially biased standards of "merit." As
Professor Brown-Nagin has explained:
Justice Scalia uncritically accepted the plaintiffs' simplistic views of merit
and their corresponding narrative of entitlement to admission [in Grutter].
... Far from following Justice Scalia's lead, Justice Thomas aligned himself with
the most radical voice in the litigation, the Grutter intervenors (albeit without
explicitly acknowledging them). Justice Thomas's stance also mirrored the
criticism of the [University of Michigan] Law School's admissions stan-
dards leveled by several of the University's amicus curiae supporters, in-
cluding the Yale, Harvard, and Stanford Black Law Students' Associa-
tions, the National Center for Fair and Open Testing, and the Society of
American Law Teachers. Moreover, Justice Thomas's rhetoric resembled
elements of the critique that scholars on the political left have made
against traditional notions of merit for years.
Brown-Nagin, supra note 4, at 803-04 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
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blacks whose situation most desperately cries out for relief -namely,
blacks who are too poor or undereducated to be in a position to pursue
education beyond high school. Here, too, Thomas's argument is that
the remedy the traditional civil-rights community prefers is far too lim-
ited in scope, and far too tame in its demands, to address the real prob-
lems facing the black community today.
The arguments of Justice Thomas in the affirmative action and de-
segregation cases are by no means the arguments of a "traitor" to his
race or of someone who "thinks white." They are black-nationalist ar-
guments for deep, meaningful social change from someone who is not
willing to let white society off the hook as easily as many traditional
civil-rights groups are.130 In his race opinions, Thomas rejects "band-aid
solutions," such as racial balancing and racial preferences in admissions,
in support of more fundamental reforms that treat the underlying
wound -reforms such as school choice, admissions preferences based
on socioeconomic disadvantage instead of race, and neutral admissions
standards that do not systematically disadvantage minorities and thus
require no racial preferences to counteract their racially exclusionary
effects. Thomas, like his critics, may be wrong on these matters, but his
arguments, like theirs, are based on a good-faith assessment of the best
interests of the black community-just as Malcolm X's rejection of the
integration agenda of the civil rights movement in the 1960s was.
III. CAN A CONSTITUTIONALIST JUDGE BE A BLACK NATIONALIST?
In light of his opinions, we need to change our perception of
Justice Thomas. He is not simply a judicial conservative on the far
right of the Court. Behind his well-known constitutionalism lies,
ironically enough, a black nationalist. That black nationalist- whom
130 As Mark Tushnet has explained: "Justice Thomas's opinions on education and
African Americans contain several themes. First, they are concerned with ensuring
that public policy address real problems in education for African Americans: failing
inner-city schools, the relative underperformance of black males, and the like. Sec-
ond, they are infused with scorn for policies supported by elites that assuage their
consciences by seeming to address those problems without doing so and that allow
elites to maintain essentially undisturbed the institutions with which they are famil-
iar and from which they benefit." Tushnet, supra note 58, at 330.
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I have termed "Clarence X"- pays careful attention to whether or
not his decisions on matters involving race advance the interests of
the black community and does not hesitate to speak out when liti-
gants urge positions that would undermine those interests as he
sees them. On such matters, as Justice Thomas himself said in a
1998 speech, all of his efforts and energies "were to help [the black
community], not to hurt."13
1
That is all well and good, but it gives rise to a question: can a
constitutionalist, such as Justice Thomas, be a black nationalist? As a
constitutionalist, Thomas is committed to the idea of judicial re-
straint-the idea that judges should not "make" the law but rather
enforce the law as declared in written texts and as understood by the
drafters of the relevant text and in tradition.132 One might therefore
argue that, to the extent Thomas's opinions are driven by black na-
tionalism, a commitment to colorblindness, or, for that matter, any
other principle not fairly derived from his method of constitutional
interpretation, he is a judicial activist, not the constitutionalist and
proponent of judicial restraint that he portrays himself to be.
133
The critique is clever because it allows Thomas critics essentially
to have their cake and eat it too. On this view, it is acceptable -
131 Thomas, supra note 69.
132 See, e.g., Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1556 (2008) (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment) (declining to join the majority opinion because it "finds no support in the
original understanding of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause"). In his re-
cent autobiography, Thomas reiterated his commitment to judicial restraint, which
he described as "central to my approach to judging": "In the legislative and execu-
tive branches, it's acceptable (if not necessarily right) to make decisions based on
your personal opinions or interests. The role of a judge, by contrast, is to interpret
and apply the choices made in those branches, not to make policy choices of his
own." THOMAS, supra note 20, at 204.
133 Jeffrey Rosen presented one of the first such criticisms of Thomas in a wide-
ranging New Yorker article published in 1996. See Jeffrey Rosen, Moving On: In His
Latest Incarnation, Justice Clarence Thomas Takes His Text From Booker T. Washington,
NEW YORKER, Apr. 29, 1996, at 66-73. Professor Rosen faulted Thomas for "im-
pos[ing] his moral objections to racial classifications on the entire country by judicial
fiat" despite the lack of evidence that the Equal Protection Clause was intended to
embody a colorblindness principle. Id. at 72. These arguments appear to be catching
on among Thomas critics. See, e.g., R. Kennedy, supra note 68, at 103-07. See generally
Book Note, Justice Thomas's Inconsistent Originalism, 121 HARV. L. REv. 1431 (2008).
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indeed, laudable- for liberal Justices to impose their policy preferences
on the country through constitutional fiat; the only sin is for conser-
vative Justices to do so. That is so despite the fact that liberal judicial
activism is no more democratically legitimate than its conservative
cousin. So, for example, Justice Thurgood Marshall is praised for us-
ing the Constitution to advance his vision of racial justice, but Justice
Thomas is condemned as an "activist" for supposedly doing the same
thing.134
Nevertheless, the Gordian Knot of the activism charge is not
difficult to cut. The cogency of the charge rests on the assumption
that the colorblindness principle lacks any arguable basis in the text,
history, and original intent of the Fourteenth Amendment. If that
assumption is incorrect (and it is worth noting that support for the
colorblindness principle dates back more than a century),135 then
134 Ironically enough, the colorblindness principle that Professor Rosen and others
criticize Justice Thomas for adopting was advocated by none other than Justice Mar-
shall himself:
In their briefs before the Supreme Court in Brown, Marshall and his col-
leagues argued the "distinctions imposed ... based upon race and color
alone ... [are] patently [arbitrary and capricious]." That was so, they ar-
gued, because skin color "is a constitutional irrelevance" -or, as the [Legal
Defense Fund] attorneys consistently maintained, "[o]ur Constitution is
colorblind." Marshall and his colleagues concluded that "all governmen-
tally imposed race distinctions" are "odious" and that governments, which
are "bound to afford equal protection of the laws, must not impose them."
Smith, supra note 1, at 533 (footnotes omitted).
135 As the first Justice John Marshall Harlan wrote in his oft-quoted dissent from
the doctrine of "separate but equal:
[Iun view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country
no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our
Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among
citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law. The
humblest is the peer of the most powerful. The law regards man as man,
and takes no account of his surroundings or of his color when his civil
rights as guaranteed by the supreme law of the land are involved.
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
See also Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 114 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing
civil rights briefs urging colorblindness as an accepted constitutional principle). Even
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there is no support for the view that only activism could lead an
originalist to endorse a colorblind interpretation of equal protection.
Moreover, the activism charge overlooks the familiar issues of
indeterminacy and precedent in constitutional adjudication. Textu-
alists and originalists do not subscribe to the fatal conceit that their
interpretive methods will provide definitive answers to all ques-
tions of interpretation.136 In situations where the meaning of the
Constitution remains unclear after close textual and historical
analysis, judicial doctrine serves a vital role of helping "concretize
the Constitution" without "amend[ing] or eclips[ing] it.
" 137
To the extent the intended meaning of the Equal Protection
Clause is uncertain, a colorblindness principle designed to prevent
government actors from engaging in racial discrimination seems to
be an appropriate doctrinal gap-filling rule. The Reconstruction
Amendments were aimed at abolishing slavery based on race and
guaranteeing newly freed slaves, their descendants, and all other citi-
zens of the United States the "equal protection of the laws."138 A pre-
sumptive ban on race-based government action would certainly serve
without taking a definitive position on the historical support for colorblindness (and
I do not), it is worth noting just how weak some of the historical arguments against
the colorblindness interpretation of equal protection are. Critics of colorblindness
present evidence of race-conscious action by the federal government during the Civil
War era designed to benefit blacks as clear proof that equal protection was not in-
tended to require colorblindness. See generally Book Note, supra note 133, at 1437
n.26 (citing sources). The obvious problem with these arguments is that the measures
in question were undertaken at a time when equal protection had no application to
the federal government. It was not until 1954 that the Supreme Court recognized an
equal protection principle applicable to the federal government. See Bolling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). Race-conscious action by the federal government during
the Civil War and Reconstruction thus can have no bearing on the original meaning
of the concept of equal protection, which applied only to the states.
13 For example, Justice Scalia's famous defense of originalism did not claim that it
is a foolproof method of interpreting the Constitution. See Antonin Scalia, Original-
ism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CN. L. REV. 849 (1989). His claim was merely that it is supe-
rior to other interpretive methods in rooting constitutional decisions in democrati-
cally legitimate sources -sources, that is, other than the whims and policy prefer-
ences of politically unaccountable judges. See id. at 862-64.
137 Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARM. L. REV.
26, 78 (2000).
1 See U.S. CONST. amends. XIII & XIV.
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to protect blacks against discrimination based on race-which, of
course, is why the NAACP Legal Defense Fund argued over and over
again, in Brown and prior cases, that the operative constitutional
principle was that government must be strictly colorblind.
139
Theoretically, a more limited doctrine would provide the same
protection. The goal of promoting black equality might also be served
by an anti-subordination doctrine invalidating racial discrimination
against blacks but allowing race-based preferences for blacks.140 This
doctrine, however, would be difficult to square with the constitutional
text, which gives all persons (minorities and nonminorities alike) the
same right to equal protection of the laws. Moreover, the essential
predicate of the anti-subordination view of equal protection would be
confidence in the ability of judges to distinguish between "good" and
"bad" uses of race by government. At the very least, the Supreme
Court's record on this score fails to inspire the necessary confidence.
Throughout its history, the Court has endorsed uses of race that were
later understood to be patently illegitimate.141 This fact alone suggests
the utility of a colorblindness principle which is not only consistently
139 See supra note 134. As Justice Thomas has recognized, "the color-blind Constitu-
tion does not bar the government from taking measures to remedy past state-
sponsored discrimination-indeed, it requires that such measures be taken in certain
circumstances." Parents Involved in Cmty Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S.
701, 772 n.19 (2007) (emphasis added).
140 The argument would be, as Justice Harry A. Blackmun famously put it, that
"[iun order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of race." Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (separate opinion of Blackmun, J.).
141 In Plessy, for example, the Court believed segregation to be a valid use of race by
government. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 548-52 (1896). Indeed, even Justice
Harlan's famous defense of the colorblindness principle in Plessy did not prevent him
from endorsing the notion that the "white race" will "continue to be for all time" "the
dominant race in this country," and that discrimination against "the Chinaman" is
justified because the Chinese "race" is "so different from our own that we do not per-
mit those belonging to it to become citizens of the United States." Id. at 559, 561
(Harlan, J., dissenting). Similarly, in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944),
the Court readily deferred to claims by military authorities that the national security
required the detention of an entire race of Americans during World War 1I based on
Japanese ancestry, without any individualized proof of disloyalty or wrongdoing. See
generally Smith, supra note 1, at 532-34 (summarizing the mischief caused by prior judi-
cial departures from the colorblindness principle).
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adhered to but also backed up by strict judicial scrutiny designed to
"'smoke out' illegitimate uses of race."
1 42
There is one final point to be made about precedent in relation
to the charge that Justice Thomas's colorblindness opinions are ac-
tivist. In many areas, Justices encounter decisions they believe to be
wrong, yet Justices need not (and, in any case, do not) deny stare
decisis effect to all precedents they deem legally erroneous.143 Other
than the comparatively few areas that are significant enough to
warrant overrulings or perpetual dissents, justices work within the
confines of existing precedent. This is true even of originalist Jus-
tices who confront prior decisions that strayed from original mean-
ing.l4 Indeed, respect for precedent has long served as a key com-
ponent of judicial restraint.
145
After almost a century and a half, it is unrealistic to fault original-
ist Justices for accepting colorblindness as a guiding constitutional
principle, instead of wiping the slate clean and starting from scratch.
As Akhil Amar has noted, "even the best documentarian reading
must sometimes yield in court to brute facts born of earlier judicial
and political deviations." 146 Given the present state of knowledge
about the Equal Protection Clause, we can perhaps demand no more
142 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,493 (1989).
143 See Gerhardt, supra note 5, at 1286. Indeed, existing stare decisis rules are clear
that, in constitutional and nonconstitutional cases alike, mere error is not a sufficient
basis for overruling prior precedent. In either context, "any departure from the doc-
trine of stare decisis demands special justification." Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203,
212 (1984) (constitutional issues); see also, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491
U.S. 164, 172 (1989) (same for statutory issues).
144 See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 136, at 861 (noting that "almost every originalist would
adulterate [originalism] with the doctrine of stare decisis"). Contrary to Justice Scalia's
suggestion, belief in stare decisis need not be viewed as an "adulteration" of originalism.
After all, the Framers were well aware of the idea of precedent and regarded precedent
as an important safeguard against judicial tyranny. As Alexander Hamilton declared in
Federalist No. 78: "To avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that
they should be bound down by strict rules and precedents which serve to define and
point out their duty in every particular case that comes before them." THE FEDERALIST
No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (emphasis added).
145 See generally Stephen F. Smith, Activism as Restraint: Lessons from Criminal Proce-
dure, 80 TEX. L. REv. 1057, 1087, 1087 n.126 (2002).
146 Amar, supra note 137, at 28.
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of the Justices than that they articulate and apply an understanding
of "equality" that makes sense in light of the evils against which the
Clause took aim.
By the time Justice Thomas joined the Court, it was already firmly
committed to colorblindness as the core idea behind equal protection.
As early as World War II, the Court could assert that "[d]istinctions
between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very na-
ture odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the
doctrine of equality." 147 Then came Brown v. Board of Education in 1954,
which declared the "fundamental principle" that "racial discrimination
in public education is unconstitutional."148 Decades later, in cases like
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke149 and City of Richmond v.
J.A. Croson Co.,130 the Court applied the nondiscrimination principle to
certain remedies designed to benefit racial minorities. Croson was a
particularly significant development, because there the Court flatly
declared that all racial classifications, even so-called "benign" ones
such as affirmative action, are disfavored and thus subject to strict scru-
tiny, at least at the state and local level.151
Justice Thomas joined the Court two years after Croson. When the
issue of affirmative action returned to the Court in Adarand Construc-
tors, Inc. v. Pefia,152 he could have urged a fundamental rethinking of
the Court's approach to racial classifications. Nevertheless, he took the
prior decisions defining equal protection in colorblindness terms at
face value and accepted the idea that, as he put it, there is no "racial
147 Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943).
14 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 298 (1955) (describing holding in original
Brown decision).
149 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (striking down racial quotas or set-asides in public univer-
sity admissions).
150 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (striking down racial preference in state government con-
tracting); see also, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273 (1986) (plu-
rality opinion) (invalidating race-based preferences for teachers facing layoffs and
reasoning that "[any preference based on racial or ethnic criteria must necessarily
receive a most searching examination"').
151 Croson, 488 U.S. at 493.
152 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
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paternalism exception to the principle of equal protection."15 3 That
conclusion might or might not be wrong, but it was hardly "activist"
for Thomas, in the absence of compelling evidence to the contrary, to
give precedential effect to prior cases adopting the colorblindness un-
derstanding of equal protection and to follow those cases to their logi-
cal conclusion.
CONCLUSION
If, as the title of this Symposium suggests, important aspects of
the jurisprudence of Justice Thomas remain "unknown" after almost
two decades, it is only because his most vocal critics choose to mis-
characterize his votes and to stifle debate on matters of importance to
the black community. Far from manifesting indifference or hostility
to the interests of black Americans, Thomas's opinions reveal a Jus-
tice who is intensely concerned with the plight and progress of black
America. To be sure, he has criticized affirmative action and other
race-conscious remedies favored by traditional civil rights groups
and voted against them where he believed the law required him to
do so. His criticisms, however, were based on his concern that those
measures are not responsive to the needs of the black community and
may actually be counterproductive. Now that nondiscrimination is
the supreme law of the land, Thomas believes the path to progress for
black Americans lies in self-reliance and self-improvement. This em-
phasis on blacks improving their own plight through education and
economic empowerment instead of relying on the beneficence of oth-
ers places Thomas squarely in a long line of black nationalists that
includes the now-beloved icon of Malcolm X, who had his own
heated disagreements with the civil rights leadership during the
1960s and was once regarded as a dangerous radical.
153 Id. at 240 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Al-
though Adarand adhered to a line of prior colorblindness cases, it did overrule Metro
Broadcasting. See id., at 227. It did so, however, on the ground that Metro Broadcasting
had unjustifiably departed from a line of precedent holding the federal government
to the same standards of nondiscrimination as state and local governments. See id.
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Like his critics (and his supporters), Thomas may or may not be
right on the merits. Indeed, there may not be any one "right" an-
swer on an issue as complex as how best to advance the interests of
a race comprised of tens of millions of people, from all different
walks of life, spread out across an entire continent. It is clear, how-
ever, that, right or wrong, Justice Thomas has spoken as eloquently
and passionately as anyone about the issues of racial justice that
have come before the Supreme Court during his tenure. This has
made for a distinctive brand of conservative jurisprudence that is
infused with black nationalism- interesting reading for Court-
watchers and those interested in honest debate on pressing issues of
racial justice.
With any luck, Thomas's most strident critics will stop hurling
accusations and epithets about his opinions and join more thoughtful
commentators in reading them with an open mind. If they do, maybe
we can finally have an honest, respectful debate, both within the
black community and the nation at large, about uncomfortable but
vitally important issues of racial justice. What is more, maybe, after
twenty years, they will finally recognize Justice Thomas for what and
who he really is. He is neither knave nor fool -least of all any sort of
racial Benedict Arnold (whatever that might mean). He is, quite sim-
ply, Clarence X, a proud black man who has a surprising amount in
common with another famous black man who went by the initial X.
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